On Teaching and Education I: Learning and Coercion

I’ve been in the education industry now, off and on (but mostly on) since 2007, in a range of capacities: substitute teacher in public high schools, teacher’s assistant in a large public research university, an instructor in a tiny historically black private college, and, in a couple months, a grad student and TA at a wealthy private research university. Besides my work as a teacher I have experienced a wide range of educational settings as a student: a small private school (kindergarten, though because of my family moving, I never officially graduated), followed by a couple of years in public school. I disliked school and my parents, thanks be to God, didn’t compel me to continue a compulsory public education, and instead let me be homeschooled. Homeschooled is a bit of a misnomer, since my childhood and adolescent education took place in lots of different settings and with lots of different teachers, besides my day-to-day ‘formal’ curriculum. I learned painting and woodcarving under the relatively informal and very personal tutelage of wonderful, experienced teachers; I spent a great deal of time hiking and exploring and camping; I participated in a (rather disorganized and not very badge-driven) Boy Scout group and in 4H; I joined a railroad history group; sat in on graduate classes in history my father was taking (and used the university library); and so on. That I have turned out a market anarchist is not really a surprise when I reflect on it: had I been forced to spend most of my waking hours in a state institution of mass education, my political, economic, cultural, and religious views would probably be much more ‘mainstream’ and malleable to State and Capital. Which is, I suppose, the point, whether intentional or unintentional. But more on that question later.

Now that I’ve briefly set out the history of my own experience with teaching and education, I’d like to reflect a little on some of the lessons I’ve learned (pun intended) over the past several years, focusing primarily on my experiences as a teacher. First, my experience in public primary-school education, the most limited of my experiences, lasting for a semester plus a few extra weeks in the second semester. I had recently finished my bachelor’s degree and wanted to begin grad school, but knew that I needed to begin learning Arabic. I also wanted to do some more traveling, so I decided to go abroad to study Arabic. In order to pay for said expedition, I took up a couple of jobs and lived with my parents; in addition, my father was deployed to Iraq so I felt a certain imperative to stay at home with my mother and youngest brother. Anyway, I took a job working for a shoestring budget skating rink; once the school year rolled around I signed up for substitute teaching, which in Mississippi at least does not require any rigorous training. I ended up teaching at a couple of schools on a regular basis: a semi-rural, semi-urban high school, and the so-called alternative school, the holding cell for ‘troubled’ students, which as often as not meant the less nasty alternative to jail. I briefly subbed at another high school but lost out on that after pissing off a rabidly militaristic and neocon civics teacher, in my first taste of being blacklisted. But that’s another story.

What follows are some of my observations from this period; none are groundbreaking (as I would later discover, much of what I learned has already been uncovered and discussed by other radical thinkers, Ivan Illich chief among them), yet the entire structure is generally accepted as a given in industrialized Western society, despite the almost blindingly obvious harms inherent in it. I cannot of course hope to list more than fraction of these harms- there are plenty of others I could enumerate. Rather I will stick to those I saw up-close, and even was forced to participate in. Also, do realize that I do not aim to incriminate any one individual, even those who were, even by the standards of the system, particularly atrocious. Rather, it is the system as a whole that I have come to condemn, the structures and procedures whose operation is not dependent upon any one person’s will or intentions.

To preface the particulars: my overall conclusion was that compulsory education is an incredibly anti-social method. Students, far from being encouraged to interact in anything resembling a free environment, find themselves, day after day, in an environment that is at once highly structured and regimented, from arriving on the bus to processing into classrooms to the punctual division of the day into timed blocks, with brief interludes of liberty in between. Students are sorted into age groups, evaluated according to performance on (increasingly centrally directed and evaluated) tests, ranked further within their age groups. Disciplinary figures are everywhere, threatening some form of more direct coercion or another. This does not mean that the students respect these impositions of authority and regimentation: in fact, they tend to resent it, and try to find ways of evading it at all turns, all the while both fearing this authority and internalizing its inevitability (as they see it, as they are drilled to see it). Students organize themselves within the interstices of the regimented day, and they extend these organizations beyond the school day. Sometimes the pent-up aggression at continual coercion bursts into open acts of belligerence, even violence, usually against each other, sometimes directed at teachers. Far from creating order, the system tends towards barely contained disorder. Substitute teachers are soft targets for strategies of evasion, though I was able for the most part to at least keep my classrooms civil, if not exactly engaged in meaningful learning.

Which brings me to another consistent pattern: the amount of ‘busy work’ designed to keep students occupied, and the complete lack of instruction in some classes. The latter reflects what I imagine, though don’t know to be, a regional variation: football and to a lesser extent basketball coaches who also teach are notoriously exempt from any standards. But neither of these problems strikes at one of the central, maybe the central, evil of the entire system, an evil that I dealt with while subbing and one I continue to deal with in colleges and universities. Simply put, students are taught to associate learning with coercion. The things that we in the humanities hold dear- literature, history, philosophy, music- become, for the average student, weapons in the hands of a power structure that operates on them day after day, year after year. I know because I had to yield them as such for this job- certainly, I was able to engage the students voluntarily, more or less, on many occasions; I tried as often as I could to avoid the tactics I saw being employed by full-time faculty. Yet even I, in order to keep things moving through the day, to go from one period to the next, as often as not had to effectively compel students to read their Shakespeare (which most of them did not understand at all, but it was on the day’s schedule) or whatever it was at hand.

For the especially bright students, or the well-connected and favored ones, all of this may not be an especially terrible experience. For them- especially the brighter kids- it is the broader anti-social atmosphere of high school that chafes them: asinine teachers, bullies, the grind of busy work, of confinement to a standardized (industrialized!) curriculum, the creation and clashing of cliques. They manage to disassociate learning with the coercive structure, or discover ways of learning that lie outside of the school’s control. For the rest, learning is physically imprinted in them (through these bodily actions, day after day after day) as an activity imposed from the outside, a method of control, humiliation even. That they reject all semblance of ‘higher culture’ upon escaping from the educational structure is not surprising; even for those who do not reject all learning, their further experiences with educational structure are forever imprinted by their years of experience in school. It is not that they reject the necessity of school: they’ve had it drilled into them, year after year; nor do they reject the authority, which they have also had drilled into them year after year. Rather, they resent it, chafe under it, and, crucially, do not desire learning. The world of learning has little or no wonder available to it; the discipline and tests and ranking and regimentation have crushed it out of them.

It is this crushing of desire and wonder, this awful associate of learning with a system of continual coercion, that I find most destructive. Certainly, for those of us teaching in colleges and universities, we face student bodies that are often times close to functional illiteracy, or who are at the very least incapable of most of the skills necessary for basic humanities courses (I can say nothing of math and science, but I would not be surprised if a similar situation obtains there as well). Opening discussions in class (which is a primary task among teacher’ assistants) is doubly difficult: the students have rarely read the assigned material nor do they especially comprehend it. If one can get them to discuss, it is nearly impossible to engage them, since they will not- in class at least!- counter-say a teacher, not without lots of urging. They do not love the authorities over them, nor do they respect them, but they will not gainsay them. For a teacher’s assistant trying to stimulate a discussion about the Venerable Bede, it’s a depressing scenario, but one repeated over and over again. But for an operator of the authority of state or corporate capital, it’s the perfect scenario: unhappy subservience, but unquestioning subservience.

But before I spin off another tangent, let me return to, and end with, the most troubling environment in which I worked, the alternative school. These were students who had been caught in the teeth of the system, and were being slowly shredded to bits. The threat of actual prison- juvie, then adult- was always over their heads. Many of them- freshmen, sophomores, mind you- had lost count of the number of times that had been hauled in by the cops or disciplinary officers. The roots of their problems were various: most came from deeply troubled homes, nearly all had been caught in the crossfire of the drug war, all, so far as I could tell, were from chronically poor backgrounds. Their lives were chronicles of all the state institutions that wage war on the poor: prisons, judges, schools, welfare programs, the projects, cops, alongside the ugly constant of disordered families and utterly fragmented communities, wracked by drugs, poverty, and violence. None of these programs had ‘helped’ them, nor were they supposed to, of course. The alternative school, as I mentioned above, was for the most part a last stop, a last ditch effort. Certainly, in terms of school structure and daily procedure, it heightened the coercive nature of schooling: pat-downs, metal detectors, locks on everything, constant surveillance. Not that I entirely minded it, mind you- some of these kids had committed violence in the past, and for a skinny white twenty-something guy having backup nearby gave a measure of reassurance. That said, the environment in the actual classrooms was, in some ways, less coercive and oppressive than in ‘normal’ schools. Certainly, some of the teachers seem to have missed out on a career as prison-guards, but they were the exception- the teachers were, for the most part, genuinely kind and decent. Classes were relatively loosely organized, compared to ‘normal’ school, and since classes were (for reasons of security probably more than anything) small I got to know the students and other teachers pretty well. Some of my most enjoyable times of teaching took place there, in large part I think because my class periods gave the students a little glimpse outside of their otherwise deeply disordered lives shuttling between one coercive authority after another, with stops in utter disorder and violence in between. Teaching tended to be relatively informal; sometimes I would just read passages from books to my students, stopping to gloss difficult bits. It was also a heartbreaking experience: here were kids who had already been passed through the larger educational and judicial mills, and- I knew in the back of my head- were almost certainly going to end up behinds bars, or murdered, or dead from an overdose or cop’s bullet or alcohol, or living in cyclical poverty. I could offer my miniscule cup of compassion, but that was it.

To be sure, all is not terrible: I came across plenty of bright spots as well, smart and engaged students, students who refused to simply swallow everything fed them, teachers who genuinely loved to teach and even managed to impart some of their love of learning to their students. Certainly the anti-social and anti-learning tendency of compulsory, centralized education does not always destroy learning and creativity and so on- it’s not an utterly total system, nor an always consistent or homogenized one, thank God. Some components are far more negative than others, and individual teachers, students, and others can make a considerable difference. But for all of the particular and personal examples one can summon the overall system looms supreme and ultimately dominating, operating just as well- perhaps better- with these positive blimps in the radar existing. The system does not need mere reforms, as politicians of both statist parties will content: it needs to be demolished, and teaching and learning need to be re-imagined and re-built from the ground up.

On Cultural Relativity, Scripture Exegesis, and the Rule of Love

Re-reading St. Augustine of Hippo’s On Christian Teaching, I have been struck- again- at just how much the great North African saint is able to cover in a relatively small space, and within what seems like a fairly circumscribed and particular topic- the proper technique of scripture exegesis. Yet St. Augustine covers everything, it seems like, and it’s a joy to read: he works through sign-theory of language, how to confront the Zeitgeist and come out the richer, the role of art and science in the life of the Christian, the healing power of Christ- along with the expected exegetical techniques. It’s a little breathless at times, as he weaves in and out of topics while continually drawing the conversation back to exegesis and scripture. He often times manages to feel remarkably contemporary to our own concerns, while also quite clearly transcending (well, transcending is obviously anachronistic) our usual categories for thinking about scripture, exegesis, epistemology, and so on. St. Augustine is neither a ‘fundamentalist’ nor a ‘liberal’ in thinking about scripture: scripture is inspired, inspired through the writing of the human authors, who are clearly agents and not mere autodidacts. Scripture can have multiple, simultaneous senses, and St. Augustine is remarkably comfortable with conflicting translations even, on some levels (some translations are just bad, he suggests, and easily enough corrected). The ultimate rule for exegesis is a little startling: whatever encourages love of God and other people, is the best- the true- interpretation. And if an exegete arrives at an edifying meaning not intended by the original author- well, that’s good too.

Over all is the rule of love, as exemplified in the passage I present below. Love of God is the centering point for human life, and when we love God we will love ourselves and others properly, not dominating and controlling them but embracing them in kindness and knowledge of our mutual places in God’s divine economy. There is, I think, an implicit critique of pretty much all forms of human authority and domination of each other going on here, even if St. Augustine does not fully articulate it. He envisions life lived under the sign, the rule of Love, in which human relationships are properly ordered, not through the pride and lust of the powerful and dominating (or ourselves attempting to be powerful and dominating), but through a love-centered orientation towards God. Even the task of exegesis, as he argues at the beginning of this work, is a love-centered task. The very existence of exegesis forms community, as we need each other to truly understand the sacred text; we are not to boast over our special knowledge of the text nor hoard it or lord it over others. Even commentary ought to be done under the rule of love- agaparchy, we might call it- though of course there is no ‘system’ here, since love is particular, is oriented first towards the Person of God, then to those we live with, our neighbors.

But anyway- one could spend pages (and plenty of people have!) on the many things St. Augustine is doing and saying in these pages and in others. I am always amazed at the scope, and the frequent bursts of beauty and sense of love, even as in other places St. Augustine’s fallibility and limitations are equally in sight. But throughout I find that he presents possibilities and points of thinking- and doing, loving, acting- that continue to be full of potential and possibility, and, I suspect, will be for years to come.

This example comes from Book Three, and in it we see a good instance of St. Augustine’s welding of seemingly extra-exegetical concerns- here, what we might identify as ‘cultural relativism’- with explicitly exegetical and theological concerns. The exegetical concern is to explain the seemingly odd or even shocking behavior of Old Testament figures; the theological concern, so far as it is separate from the exegetical, is to reconcile the apparent relativism of cultural convention with an over-arching moral order. Obviously, St. Augustine’s words do not fully sum up the issues we might raise here- but they’re remarkably deft and penetrating, and within a quite short space. There is lots to think about, and not just to think about- the rule of Love, St. Augustine would tell us, is not a political program or an abstract problem. It is a way of life, realized in the love of Christ, and lived out day-by-day, step-by-step.

*

‘Whatever accords with the social practices of those with whom we have to live this present life- whether this manner of life is imposed by necessity or undertaken in the course of duty- should be related by good and serious men to the aims of self-interest and kindness, either literally, as we ourselves should do, or also figuratively, as is allowed to the prophets. When those who are unfamiliar with different social practices come up against such actions in their reading, they think them wicked unless restrained by some explicit authority. They are incapable of realizing that their own sort of behavior patterns, whether in matters of marriage, or diet, or dress, or any other aspect of human life and culture, would seem wicked to other races or other ages. Some people have been struck by the enormous diversity of social practices and in a state of drowsiness, as I would put it- for they were neither sunk in the deep sleep of stupidity nor capable of staying awake to greet the light of wisdom- have concluded that justice has no absolute existence but that each race views its own practices as just. So since the practices of all races are diverse, whereas justice ought to remain unchangeable, there clearly is no such thing as justice anywhere.

To say no more, they have not realized that the injunction “do not do to another what you would not wish to be done to yourself” can in no way by modified by racial differences. When this injunction is related to the love of God, all wickedness dies; and when it is related to the love of one’s neighbor, all wrongdoing dies. For nobody wants his own dwelling to be wrecked, and so he should not wish to wreck God’s dwelling (which is himself). Nobody wants to be harmed by anybody; so he should not do harm to anybody. So when the tyranny of lust has been overthrown love rules with laws that are utterly just: to love God on his account, and to love oneself and one’s neighbor on God’s account. Therefore in dealing with figurative expressions we will observe a rule of this kind: the passage being read should be studied with careful consideration until its interpretation can be connected with the realm of love. If this point is made literally, the no kind of figurative expression need be considered.’

St. Augustine of Hippo, On Christian Teaching, Book Three, XII-XIV

Fragments, ii

I enjoy occasionally looking at the search terms that brought readers to my blog. Alas, I am afraid that some of them left without anything remotely connected to what they were looking for. Though, for some, I am not entirely sure what they were looking for: the search term string is a tiny trace of ephemera in this great web of ephemeral jottings, thin connections to someone’s intention, or half-formed intention and desire (hence the searching…).

From a couple days ago:

al ghazali 1
deer blind stencils for corn stalks 1
the andalucian islam 1
katrina place 1
ornamentalism 1
national underwear day 1
sefrou – a side trip

*

Is there a National Underwear Day (if there is, Knoxville is surely the place to be for it, and presumably the reason my blog was pointed to)? Have the Proof of Islam and deer stands ever before been associated? Do the lands that the storm Katrina ravaged now cohere in a single ‘place’?

Fragments

Two fragments from the cover of a notebook of mine. First, a short verse on the scholarly life, lifted from the epigraph of Makdisi’s Rise of Colleges:

ذكا و حرص و افتقار و غربة
و تلقين استذ و طول زمان

Intelligence, longing; poverty and a foreign land
A teacher’s instruction; the long stretch of time

Jawaini of Nishapur

And one that is, I think, from the Moroccan Sufi Abu Madyan; it’s scrawled on the cover of one of my notebooks without an ascription:

النفس عزت و لكن فيك ابذلها
و القتل مر ولكن في رضاك حلا

The self* is dear, yet I slay it in You
And being killed is bitter; but in Your pleasure, sweet

*(An-nafs conveys both the sense of ‘soul’ and of ‘self,’ anima and ego; in Sufi thought and practice, overcoming the ‘lower soul’ or self in the apprehension of God is a primary goal. The dying of the self is obviously a term deeply resonant in Christian practice; likewise, the studied ambiguity about one’s relation to the self/soul exists in both traditions. St. Augustine is, I suppose, the most marked exponent of this tension, in which there is a proper ‘self-love’ and an improper one, so that loving one’s self is, for St. Augustine, a necessity, yet only in so far as it is properly directed. Paradoxically, the highest love of self would be the abnegation of the self in a Christ-like self-humbling and self-offering to God. In a similar manner, Sufism seeks a self-destroying abnegation in God, yet one in which the self is still there- even for someone like al-Hallaj, the nafs remains even in the closest union with God. Still, it is always an ambiguous thing in Sufi texts, as the soul/self is consumed utterly while the author still maintains a self-existence (if not self-awareness) and distinction between Creator/creation.)

Papers, Please

One of the most effective means of State control is the relentless production of required papers, permits, documents, and so on, from business licenses to drivers licenses to Social Security numbers. When a person has not met the vast number of government requirements the State has the “right” to harass and commit violence against that person. And since we are taught, virtually from birth on, that filling out papers and carrying our documents and meeting every jot and tittle of government regulations is not only necessary to avoid physical pain, but also morally good (how would society function without it?), we rarely question the value or justice of the endless regulations and documentation the State requires. The documentation regime- an integral part as well in the bureaucratic sense of totalizing control, in which every object under the State’s rule is documented and accounted for- is continually expanding, as the State seeks to extend its tentacles into every last aspect of life. And once established, one can hardly just decide to ignore it; in this both State and Capital are willing partners, as government documentation becomes necessary for transactions in the “private” sphere. Part of this, of course, is just the State’s desire to expropriate as much wealth as possible; hence anything that is “undocumented” is evil. Undocumented workers and undocumented transactions generate little or no revenue for the State and are hence evil. And when persons and entities ignore the documentation regime, they become less visible to the State and increasingly harder to control. Most importantly, when we ignore the documentation regime, when our lives are not tied into the control mechanisms and papers of the State and Capital, we begin to feel less a part of their systems, and begin to feel that our existence is not so directly tied to their existence. We begin to question, consciously or unconsciously, the legitimacy of an all-embracing State.

All of that is apropos of this article: Texas pastor protesting traffic stop arrested. The pastor and his congregation made several “mistakes” vis-a-vis the State. The accused driver lacked one of the many offical papers required for movement; as any centralized State knows, controlling and regulating human movement is absolutely vital to maintaining power. The church, apparently, also lacked proper papers, in this case an “occupancy license” required to hold services. Again, undocumented anythings are a danger to the State, even- perhaps especially- churches. Just ask the Chinese State- properly documented, “law-abiding” churches are not a threat; it is the congregations that refuse to be absorbed into the system that pose the true threat. Finally, the pastor made the mistake of a genuine protest: he was directly confronting the excercise of State power. Protest in the sense of marching on the Mall or something is no threat to the State; it serves in fact as a catharsis, an outlet for popular anger. Some governments, of course, savage all forms of protest, from petitioners to street marchers; other, arguably more savvy ones, integrate protest. But only within limits. This pastor overstepped those limits and met the consequences. For while governments, here and everywhere, largely rely upon the built-in acceptance and acquiesence to their policies, the threat of real physical violence is ultimately the source of power and authority. Papers or pepperspray, or worse.

One last point- the documentation regime is only part of the tendency, on both the part of governments and big capital, to reduce the person to a number, a aggregate of data, for purposes of control and marketing. Gabriel Marcel, the Catholic existentialist of the last century, wrote in several of his works about this tendency of the modern world to subsume all other aspects of human identity in offical information and data; the tendency continues and has arguably increased in the internet age, particularly for marketers. However, the internet also poses a challenge,since it is considerably harder to control, and is hence the cause of endless anxiety for governments from Washington to Beijing. At any rate, the documentation, person-reducing tendencies of State and Capital stand in stark relief to the iconic, “personalist” ideology of the Church. An icon, for example, is not a passport photo; it is not a reduction of the person into a mass of statistics and numbers. Hagiography is not, to the frustration of historians for the past couple of centuries, raw information, but is instead closer to a hymn or poem directed at the saint being honoured and held up as an example of transformed, Deified humanity. Even monastic life, which at first glance seems to be the most regulated aspect of Christian life, reveals a surprising latitute unallowable by modern governments, as abbots and spiritual directors mold their judgment and suggestions for each individual under their tutaleage. As the letters of two solitaries and spiritual directors from sixth century Gaza, Barsanuphius and John, reveal, the “rule” for one spiritual disciple may be entirely different from another, as one disciple is encouraged to fast more or pray a certain number of times, while another is directed in an entirely different manner. John and Barsanuphius, of course, are not relativists in any way; rather they recognize the differences between different people, different states (in Sufism a similar practice is embraced under the idea of differing maqam, stations of the spiritual life, that vary from one person to another).

Finally, the presence of Christ in the Church is in general disruptive to attempts by both State and Capital to exert their control; again, the most expansively totalitarian regimes of recent years understood this quite well and sought to control and co-opt the Faith as much as they could. Jesus does not carry papers; or rather, His “documentation” in the world ultimately moves in channels different from and ultimately uncontrollable by any temporal State. The central action of the Eucharist breaks into a world of data and person-control, as an undocumented Savior offers His Body and Blood for each person in His Body, food and drink “without cost,” in Isaiah’s borderless gathering of the peoples on the Mountain of God. From Baptism to Eucharist, Christ offers an identity rooted, not in regulations or marketing or fear or lust, but in a Living Savior Who unites each person with Himself and calls Him to theosis, to transformation in God. And surely anyone genuinely living the baptised life, inhabiting the world not of endless documents and statistics and advertising campaigns, is a far greater threat than any violent revolutionary or marching protestor.

Change We Can Believe In

From Spiked: Under Obama No Child Left Unmonitored. Don’t like No Child Left Behind? Notice that Federal intervention in education is producing less than admirable results? Question the validity of subjecting education to the dictates of State and Big Capital? The solution of the statist-left: make it bigger! Upsize! Increase funding! Greater federal control! If the Federalization of all education isn’t working, it needs to be intensified. We must increase the devotion of all levels of education to the needs of capital, er, the business sector. We must make sure poor parents are doing their bit to raise good wards for State and Capital- and remember, there’s no way Federal policy could ever be racist or classist- remember, we did that whole making history thing, right?

This is just one small aspect of the sort of leftist imperialism (external and internal) that in insiduousness and long-term viability is probably more destructive and dangerous than rightist sorts. Rightist statism has lately tended to manifest itself in spectacular and very public outbursts of violence and programs of mass control, though in the past couple of years even the Bush administration has toned down much of its action (probably out of sheer necessity). The left, on the other hand, is rather more clever about things in that much of its systems of violence and control are more hidden. Education is a useful example; abortion is another example of systematic violence that lies beneath the surface (literally in some respects) of society and even political discourse: “choice,” “reproductive health,” and so on are used to avoid the stark implications of reality. Likewise, we call our wars “missions to spread democracy,” “humanitarian interventions,” disguising the actual horrific nature of war.

Both sides also insiduously exploit religion to advance their causes, whether it’s the latest war as a crusade from God or abortion as a “spiritual sacrament.” The left tends to be in denial about its religious aspect, since part of its campaign against the right is “separation of church and state,” by which of course nothing more is meant that separation of rightist religion from the state; statist-leftist religion, whether in the guises of protected Christianities, bourgouis environmentalism, or the whole smorgasboard of liberal pieties used to advance the agenda of the day- none of these forms of religiosity are ever envisioned as being separated from the State. Instead, religion- and the same attitude exists on the statist-right- is perfectly acceptable so long as it remains in the service of a greater mission, that of the statist-left.

This is ultimately my problem also of course and I fall under the label of hypocrite too: I like my religion, just let’s not take this too seriously, eh? Sure, some of that exoticly-flavoured Orthodoxy can show through here and there, since it’s possibly advantageous out here in the academy. But let too much through, and you’re courting danger. That’s the message that is continually broadcast, and my internalization of it is hardly only from external forces- in tandem with my own passions, the desire to keep my “religion” nicely compartmentalized is terribly strong. Only the radical action of God can really ever break me, or anyone else, left or right or sideways, out of it.

Scattered Thoughts on Liturgy, Saints, and Postmodern Discourse

1. (With props to Ft. Stephen who initiated this idea for me): The Liturgy is pretty jarring. There are all sorts of things happening at once, there is an abundance of strange language (things we do not hear in our day-to-day lives), strange concepts, people standing about at odd angles, children making noise and running about, plus the abundance of icons that attract the eye and carry their own particular discourse (but more on that later God willing). We do not immediately fit into this construction, into all this language about the Kingdom of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, of forgiveness, of angels and archangels: the disjunction of imagery and sounds, the challenges and declarations (the mystery of the Holy Trinity is continually set before us). The “discourse” of the Liturgy clashes with our normal discourses, with our normal way of speaking, thinking, and acting in the world. We- our bodies, our words, our senses- are raised into Heaven, are moved onto a different level of discourse and being. This movement has the potential- if we embrace it and move with/within it, if you will- of opening up our “everyday” discourses, our everyday existence, to the radical new possibilities that are found within the discourse of the Liturgy. Of course, there is a danger that we allow the strangeness and radicalness of the Liturgy to become “normalized” so that we no longer notice it: instead of it challenging us and opening us and our ways of speaking/living up to God, we domesticate the Liturgy (or we simply drift off into our own mental world and act through the Liturgy without noticing it…), we domesticate the whole divine action and discourse that we are confronted with.

Rather, the “otherness” of the Liturgy should break into our language, into our ways of thinking in/about the world. For example, the language of loving one’s enemies, of forgiveness, is continually brought before us, clashing with our normal (unfortunately) discourse, in which forgiveness and love of the enemy is a foreign concept, an unsettling one, along with all those weird troparion abour martyrs and ascetics. What are we to do with this? If we simply “domesticate” it, if we do not accept it as a radical intrusion and opening up of our speech and our very lives, then that language, the Liturgy itself, becomes just an antiquarian artefact.

2. My web browser opens to the OCA daily calender of saints and festivals. Today’s saints struck me as particularly demonstrating the radical nature of not just the Liturgy, but of the whole of the faith. Today St. John the Merciful is commemorated: a saint who does violence to our conceptions of what charity should look like; his actions break through our bourgeouis sentiments and ethics and overturns them. How can you possibly keep giving money to a beggar you know is tricking you? My experience of St. John is similar to that which I experienced the first time I read Yoder’s Politics of Jesus: I hate what you’re saying because I know it is true and truly Christological, and it clashes so much with my assumptions, with the discourses I have assimilated and that keep me comfortable. Yet I cannot reject what he is saying (acting/doing): I see Christ in his actions, I hear the- radical and “breaking-in”- voice of Christ, reconfigured and redeployed in the saint. We need saints to speak into our lives, into our discourses, because we are always taking the Gospel and “normalizing” it, domesticating it, overlaying the words with our own comfortable assumptions. Saints like St. John overthrow this domestication.

Today the Fool-for-Christ St. John of Rostov (the Hairy!) is also commemorated. In the holy fool we find one of the supreme examples of God breaking into our “normalness” and disrupting pretty much every element of our discourse and self-image. What do you do with holy foolishness? What can we possibly do with it? By honouring the holy fool as a saint, the Church canonizes- declares to be canonical, a rule against which to measure our lives- his “crazy” life, his foolishness. Added up, the variety of “canons” declares an incredible plurality of possibilities of being-in-the-world-in-Christ, and this plurality clashes with our sensibilities of what is “respectable” and “allowable.” Again, our attempts at coopting Christ into our non-Christological modes of living are confronted and challenged. Our language of “normality,” of “sanity,” is shown to be inadequate, to be in need of a radical opening to the reality of the life of Christ. For in fact our “sanity” is so often revealed to be true craziness, to be even satanic “normality.” Our language is shown up, so to speak, for its disconnection to reality, to the inner truth of the world. The holy fool asks: who’s really crazy? Your hair is nicely trimmed and your discourse follows the expected parameters, corresponds- so you think!- to what is “real.” Yet- the holy fool in his humility (humility before the true Word) sees the world as it is, and his language is ultimately “truer” than yours.

3. Hopefully the reason I included the nebulous word “postmodernism” in the title of this post is by now clear. Orthodoxy reveals itself to have long been “postmodern” in the sense that it has always sought to confront and open up received discourse. Orthodoxy- in Liturgy, prayer, saints, icons, etc- destabilizes our language, destabilizes our view of ourselves and the world, and inserts the supra-reality of Christ: He who comes with a sword, a sword that cuts and divides and in so doing allows us to move beyond what are so often false constructions. And whereas structuralism and poststructuralism tend to move the reader towards a point of no reality, of nothing beyond constructions and their deconstruction, Christ posits reality and life beyond the ruins of our inadequate and falsifying language. Yes, our words fail (witness apothetic theology). Yes, our language is a mode of power, of coercion and falsification: but it is possible to break through that, into the true Word “spoken in silence” Who breaks up and re-assembles our discourse in the light of His Gospel and saints and in prayer and so on. Where deconstructionism proper can lead to nihilism or irrationalism, the “deconstructing” of Christ leads into the Resurrected Life, from the “death” of language (and author and subject!) into the true life of the Word.

On Miracles and Wonder

“The miracle indeed of our Lord Jesus Christ, whereby He made the water into wine, is not marvelous to those who know that it is God’s doing. For He who made wine on that day at the marriage feast, in those six-water pots, which He commanded to be filled with water, the self-same does this every year in vines. For even as that which the servants put into the water-pots was turned into wine by the doing of the Lord, so in like manner also is what the clouds pour forth changed into wine by the doing of the same Lord. But we do not wonder at the latter, because it happens every year: it has lost its marvelousness by its constant recurrence. And yet it suggests a greater consideration that that which was done in the water-pots. For who is there that considers the works of God, whereby this whole world is governed and regulated, who is not amazed and overwhelmed with miracles? If he considers the vigorous power of a single grain of any seed whatever, it is a mighty thing, it inspires him with awe. But since men, intent on a different matter, have lost consideration of the works of God, by which they should daily praise Him as Creator, God has, as it were, reserved to Himself the doing of certain extraordinary actions, that, by striking them with wonder, He might rouse men as from sleep to worship Him.”

St. Augustine, On the Gospel of John

How often do we become caught up in the day-to-day mendacity of our lives, as we shuttle back and forth in our closed-up automobiles to and from closed-up spaces filled with the hum and glow of our computers and televisions and whatever other gadgets we have? If it was easy in St. Augustine’s time for people to lose sight of the wonder of creation, of the natural (or, for St. Augustine, supernatural) world all about, how much easier it is, who live in a universe that is consistently stripped of wonder?

In the Syriac tradition, as exemplified by Sts. Ephrem, Jacob of Serugh, John of Apamea, Isaac the Syrian, and others, wonder- at creation, at God, at God’s special actions on behalf of our salvation- is one of the keys of true theology. For Jacob of Serugh especially, without wonder theology is pretty useless- it is dry and without real connection, without real penetration of the heart and mind. Only in love and wonder before the beauty of God, manifested in His creation and His divine economy in Christ, can we truly understand, can we truly live the life of Christ. That is one of the reasons that Christ calls us to be ‘as little children’- to re-open our eyes to the wonder of God, to the wonder of life. This is not an easy thing to do- it’s far easier to settle into comfortable cynicism and detachment, which are fair enough attitudes no doubt for many aspects of contemporary life (or any period’s life), but are destructive if extended to all of life. When we grow so detached, so numbed to the world beyond our reductive science, our electronic screens, and the mundane tasks that we tend to have to engage in, we are not merely losing connection with nature- we are losing connection with God, with reality, and with the possibility of true humanity.

This is not to disparage as sinful or only destructive things like science, technology, work, and so on- but rather to suggest that we must constantly be careful to draw back from those things at times, to have our hearts and eyes open to the wonder inherent in the world that is, for all our concrete and fiber optics, still around us and visible. If we stop to contemplate things as simple as trees- we discover there is nothing simple or reductive about them, but, as St. Augustine tells us, they are a cause for wonder and adoration towards God, as exemplars of His creative power and sustenance. From there we can begin to re-engage wonder at the mystery of salvation, of God’s divine economy in the world. I think that if taken from this tack we are less likely to reduce those mysteries to mere dictum, objects to be analyzed and mechanistically digested or accepted. Instead, we begin to realize, with Jacob and Ephrem and Augustine, the wonder of the Incarnation of Christ, of our Lady, of the Divine Liturgy and the mystery of prayer. From there we have greater hope of doing true theology, of truly delving into the divine mysteries with our hearts and minds, beholding God, not in detachment, but in loving wonder.

A Slap in the Face

“An anecdote had it that he [‘Ali an-Nashi’, d. 976] was once engaged in a disputation with al-Ash’ari… The disputation was in progress when, for no reason at all, he slapped al-Ash’ari’s face. Taken aback, Ash’ari demanded the reason for his opponent’s unprofessional conduct. Nashi’ said: ‘That is God’s doing, why get angry with me?’ Beside himself, Ash’ari exclaimed, ‘It is you doing alone, and it is bad conduct exceeding the bounds of decency in a disputation!’ Whereupon Nashi’ replied triumphantly: ‘You have contradicted yourself! If you persist in your doctrine, then the slap was God’s doing; but if you have shifted from your position, then exact the equivalent!’ Whereupon the audience broke in peals of laughter; Nashi’ had made his point that humans are responsible for human acts.”

The Rise of Colleges, Makdisi

I suppose that many of my readers will be familiar with the perennial debates in Christian traditions over the nature and extent of God’s knowledge and determination of human actions. As the above story should demonstrate, the same sorts of questions early on arose in Islam, and became topics of heated debate- and at least one very clever “visual aid.”

On Religious Pluralism

The following is a paper I wrote last year for a Philosophy of Religion class. I came back across it the other day while re-arranging files and folders and thought it would make a decent blog posting (at some point I will try to integrate the footnotes into the blog post). Reading back over it I saw some things I think should be worded differently and considered more carefully; however, my basic criticisms of religious pluralism as a realist philosophy of religion still stand. The question of the intersection and conflict of truth claims in religions is a terribly important, and, I think, quite difficult one to deal with, if one is committed to a realist view of truth in religion, and is equally committed to honest appraisals of all religious traditions. As I freely confess in the paper, I do not suppose myself to have arrived at completely satisfactory solutions.

*

Religious Pluralism Considered

He [a Brahman] enquired why God sent the Shastras if they were not to be observed. I answered how do you know that God sent the Hindu Shastras, did he send the Mussulmen’s Koran also? He answered that God had created both Hindus and Mussulmen, and had given them different Ways of Life. I said then God could neither be wise nor unchangeable to do so, and that all such foolish Worship was unworthy of either God or Men.

*

There’s an airline plane
Flies to heaven everyday
Past the pearly gates…

Well a lot of people guess
Some say no and some say yes
Will it take some and leave some behind?

*

1. Introduction: Few questions in either religion or philosophy have so much real-world weight as the question raised by the numerous religious systems of humanity. The nature of religious truth claims is not only a concern for the individual faced with competing religions, but is also an issue for entire nations and peoples faced with conflicts often colored by deeply engrained religious disputes. Religious pluralism, or, more accurately, religious diversity, is brought to the fore most acutely in the direct conflicting interaction of two religions, as in the instance above taken from the journal of the early nineteenth-century Baptist missionary William Carey. It is also an issue in what Basinger refers to as “inter-system” differences within broad theistic systems, such as questions within Christianity over the nature of the ultimate eternal state of humans, a question that finds echo in Woody Guthrie’s “Airline to Heaven.” With the spread of globalism along with the post-Cold War resurgence of religious belief, particularly in the public-sphere, the issue of religious truth claims, exclusivism, and the possibility- or impossibility- of somehow reconciling competing religions remains an absolutely vital one, in terms of both philosophical and practical concern.

In recent years the idea of religious pluralism has arisen as a possible means of reconciling seemingly conflicting traditions, and has been much espoused as a way to integrate religions into a peaceful pluralistic society. Briefly put, religious pluralism, as advocated by John Hick and others, posits an ultimate and ineffable Real that is the focus of all religious traditions. All religions are veridical for the religious believer, offering means of relating to the Absolute in some way. All religions, Hick asserts, are equally competent in turning believers from “ego-centric” lives to “other-centric” lives, centered on the ineffable Real. Pluralism does not deny that there are differences between religions; rather it says these differences and the impossibility of properly reconciling them are proof that they are all partakers of the Real, and the best solution in this life is to take a tolerant agnostic approach to these differences.

But does pluralism in fact offer a cogent and acceptable solution to the very manifest problem of religious diversity? And if it does not, how is one to deal with the issue, while maintaining a realist view of truth and the veridical value of religion? While it is, unsurprisingly, not difficult to find serious problems with religious pluralism, offering an alternative solution is difficult. Therefore this paper will first present significant negative issues with pluralism before offering a (tentative) alternative.

2. Differences Between Religions: One of the principal problems with religious pluralism is that it has a tendency to approach religions from a decidedly generic standpoint: talk of “religions” ultimately replaces talk of Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, for example, in such a way that the language of those traditions is collapsed into seemingly common terms. For example, St. Gregory of Nyssa and Lao Tzu both speak of ineffability in dealing with “the Absolute”; Christianity and Buddhism both encourage self-renunciation; therefore, they must share certain common referents. Despite ostensibly recognizing differences between religions, religious pluralism ultimately fails to take these differences seriously, in as much as it cannot ultimately affirm both the truth-value of traditions (such as those traditions claim for themselves) and their equal validity in terms of veridicality, without somehow laying claim to a vantage point more exalted in its relaying of ultimate truth than the religions under consideration.

When we examine the claims of a given religion, including both doctrinal propositions and the content of religious experience, we find what are truly serious differences in the basic approach to and understanding the “Real an sich.” Perhaps the most obvious and important would be the difference between conceptions of God- or Brahman, or the Absolute- as personal or non-personal. This is a major division between Eastern and Western philosophy and theology, and it cannot be made to vanish easily. Further yet, some Buddhist traditions deny any sort of Real or Absolute at all, rather describing reality as ultimately Emptiness and Nothingness. And all Buddhist traditions, if they posit an Ultimate of any sort at all, conceive of it radically differently from Western religions, alongside a radically different concept of noncontradiction than underlies all Western theologies and philosophies. It is true that both speak of ineffable reality in some sense. However, in the first place, as Ward notes, if one is presented with an ineffable X and an ineffable Y, one is not therefore obliged to suppose them identical. In fact, by very point of ineffability the question arises as to whether one could say anything at all about the two ineffables, including whether they were two, or one, or more: much less whether they were somehow identical- a very significant quantification indeed!

Further, concepts of ineffability vary greatly. In the Western traditions the ineffability of God does not mean that He is unknowable in an ultimate sense; if that were so theology would be pointless. Rather, the doctrine of God’s ineffability is quite specific in what it delineates. It is quite different from Hick’s conception of ineffability, in which he says of the Real that is unknowable- we cannot ascertain whether it is one or many, personal or non-personal, and so on. But this immediately raises another important question: how then can Hick or anyone else speak of the Real, if it is truly ineffable as he describes? And even supposing his language about it (assuming it to be a monad of some sort, simple or otherwise) is correct, how can he know that different religious traditions are speaking about the same thing if the thing being spoken about cannot be properly spoken of? We might add that pluralism could itself be described as another religious tradition, which therefore, by its own logic, cannot itself claim to absolute and exclusive truth- though surely it must claim that, contra other religious traditions which assert the exclusiveness of their claims to truth and understanding the Real (or whatever their ultimate “referent” is).

In the classic story of the elephant and the blind men often used as an analogy of religious pluralism, the King and his attendants are able to see the entire elephant. However, if all traditions are in fact blind men feeling the elephant, it is impossible for any to say what all are feeling: to do so would presuppose some kind of superior vantage point. Yet such a vantage point is destroyed by pluralism, for it would entail a very specific exclusivist claim to religious knowledge vis-à-vis the Real. Pluralism cannot offer such a vantage point without devalidating its own claims, as it- bravely, it might be added, in contrast with the blasé relativism that is current in much of academia- seeks to uncover some Ultimate Referent within all religions, that has ontological and epistemic reality. But to do so brings in internal contradictions that cripple the arguments from within.

On a similar tack we may examine Hick’s appeal to soteriological experience as a means of identifying a single Referent for all religions: “The great world religions, then, are ways of salvation. Each claims to constitute an effective context within which the transformation of human existence can does take place from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness.” But again, Hick must contend with a wide variety of “salvation experiences” that, while having some similarities, ultimately have very different ultimate referents and means. Even if we could establish, as Hick argues- and there is workable ground for the argument- that the moral and spiritual “fruit” of various paths to salvation are equally brought about by the different traditions, it would not determine that they are all being wrought by the same Reality. As Ward notes, a-religious movements and processes can produce “salvific” fruits on par with world religions, yet it would a considerable stretch to say that they are tapping into the Divine power of the Real. Considering only religions, it is still highly improbable to suppose that the salvific “referent” of different religions is the same if we take the claims of those religions seriously and do not have access to a superior vantage point outside of those experiences that would allow a somehow unfiltered view of the Real and its relation to religious traditions.

3. Pluralism as Emasculation of Religion: A common charge of pluralists is that non-pluralist forms of religion are vehicles for maladroit intolerance at best, violence and oppression at worst: “Exclusiveness regards universality as the extension of its own particularity and seeks to conquer other faiths. Inclusiveness, though seeming generous, actually co-opts other faiths without their leave. Both exclusiveness and its patronizing cousin inclusiveness may even be forms of theological violence against neighbors of other faiths…”

Certainly, the history of religions gives ample evidence of various forms of violence being enacted against members of dissenting views; to recount them here would hardly be germane. However, while it may, on the surface, appear that pluralism solves for a more open and tolerant faith, it can itself be just as pernicious a vehicle for “theological violence.” This is best demonstrated through an examination of the decidedly exclusivist message of Christ and the Early Church, but can be just as readily extended to the actions of other faiths, particularly in those religions which Ramachandra refers to as “dissenter traditions,” such as Christianity and Buddhism, both of which emerged as counterpoints or protests against the traditions they originally inhered in. Christianity was from its inception a decidedly radical faith, and was able to stand as witness against injustice, including injustice codified by religion. Christianity was not content to proclaim Christ as Lord and God alongside Caesar- the State- as Lord and God; instead, it held forth Christ alone as Lord and God- an explicit and exclusivist claim of orthodoxy- which meant an explicit subversion of the State and its illusions of divine power, along with all its attendant coercion and violence- an expression of orthopraxy flowing directly from orthodoxy.

To offer a contemporary example, Christianity in modern times has often spoken against the caste system that inheres as orthopraxy in that grouping of religions broadly defined as Hinduism. While Buddhism to a certain extent acted as an acute dissenter religion in response to the systematic violence of the caste system, historically it tended to relegate itself to “spiritual” concerns and, while fundamentally questioning the caste system, largely left it intact. However, in recent years both Christianity and Buddhism, acting self-consciously as dissenter religions, have spoken out against the injustices perpetrated against the dalits of India in the name of Hinduism. In so doing they both are declaring that the truth-value of their religious claims is superior by virtue of being a correct judgment on the nature of reality, contra the truth-claims of Hinduism. The committed pluralist, by insisting on the relative value of all religions’ truth claims and refusing to judge between them, must also insist that judgments by Christianity or Buddhism upon the injustices of caste oppression are in fact illegitimate acts of “theological violence.” That the proclamation by Christianity of the injustice of a given religion’s tenets or practices is indeed a form of “theological violence” is perfectly admissible, in light of Christ’s declaration that he was coming with “a sword”: the “violence” of confronting unjust belief systems and directly challenging their validity.

A pluralism which disbars the truth-claims of Christianity (as any pluralism which seeks to establish a supra-religious ontological reality must do) disbars its meaningful contact with people, cultures, and religions outside of it: “Only if the Christian faith is truth does it concern all men; if it is merely a cultural variant of the religious experience of mankind that is locked up in symbols and can never be deciphered, then it has to remain within its own culture and leave others in theirs.” This applies not only to Christianity, it might be noted: strict pluralism must ultimately leave all religions essentially emasculated, their truth claims- which are at root claims about the very nature of the world and man’s place in it- evacuated of their original meaning in favour of the new construction offered by modern theologians and philosophers.

And if truth is denied in a religion- truth meaning the claims of one religion about reality vis-à-vis others- religions are left mere artifices, empty Wittgensteinian language games whose relation to higher ontological reality is only incidental and is not in fact true to the content of the religions themselves. One must then question the ultimate value of religious experience, since its relation to ultimate ontological and epistemic reality is impossible to ascertain beyond very vague generalities, and the vital force of religions in the world is largely removed. Religious pluralism does violence of its own in not taking individual traditions- as noted above- on their very serious terms. While these implications cannot of themselves conclusively condemn pluralism as a theory, they must give us pause, and they do adequately address the charge that exclusivism is somehow inherently a negative force or agent of theological evil (leaving aside the somewhat obvious question of how and why we define “evil”).

4. An Alternative in a Moderated Exclusivism: Religious pluralism is therefore by any means a highly problematic solution to the problem of religious diversity. What then are other tenable solutions? It may be, as suggested by the famous arguments David Hume presents, in Of Miracles that no religions at all are true, the position of the agnostic or atheist. On a similar level one might embrace the arguments of Averroes and consider religious “truth” to be of a different sort than, say, mathematic truth. This would reduce religion to mere taste, in a way similar to Hick’s appeal to a phenomological understanding of religion. At least in Hick’s rendering, there is some, if unclear, relation of religions to the “the Real.” To demarcate religion into its own category of truth unrelated to the world is to essentially deconstruct religions- since all major religions make, whether through explicit orthodoxy or implicitly through orthopraxy, specific claims about the nature of the world. All religions hold, ultimately, to some sort of realist view of truth. Thus an Averroes-like theory would not in fact somehow “preserve” religion and thus solve the issue, but would lead to the same results as flatly denying the validity of all religions.

Outside of denial of any religious validity, some sort of exclusivism is likely in order if one is to suppose any realist truth value to religious experience can be apprehended (it may be that truth is more or less equally mixed through all religions; but how one would go about ascertaining this is highly problematic). A word about the word “exclusivism” is in order first. Any view concerning religions- including, as noted above, religious pluralism, is in some way “exclusivist” if it holds to any sort of realist view of truth and the principle of noncontradiction. However, in terms of religions, it will here mean a religion which views itself as containing either the fullness of truth or at least containing more truth than all other systems; the exclusivist viewing her religion as being the normative one for evaluating all others (the possession of some sort of normative core, even a very “stripped down” one, being ultimately necessary for making any truth claims at all). This may or may not entail judgments on the ultimate eschatological destination of those in other systems; nor must it entail its absolute validity with no truth-value in other systems. Other systems, however, cannot be seen as being ultimately normative.

That exclusivism need not obsesively concern itself with every charge of “religious imperialism” has already been demonstrated; but can the exclusivist justify her exclusivism and its truth-claims when confronted with the reality of other equally exclusivist traditions? Per the views formulated by the so-called school of Reformed Epistemology, an exclusivist can reasonably hold to her views and rationally justify holding them. However, whatever the merits of Reformed Epistemology’s arguments- and they are considerable- ultimately those arguments do not proffer an adequate way of dealing with the issue of truth, and can lead one into the same cultural and philosophical faux passé as religious pluralism and Averoeism, but one in which different religions operate in their own sealed departments. Instead, the exclusivist is obliged at the very least to consider the claims of other religions and examine the basis of his own claims if he is to hold to a realist view of his exclusive claims and meaningfully engage other religions. This examination may well entail, as Quinn suggests, “thinner theologies” that reconsider some propositions and hence reduce conflict between religious systems, without forsaking the exclusivist’s claims. Not only must such a questioning and examination not entail a forsaking of one’s normative beliefs, but it may well lead to a strengthening and revitalization of those beliefs.

It is important to note that exclusivism- say, for our purposes, Christian exclusivism- does not by any means entail denying truth-content and even divine veridicality in other religions. Rather, it may embrace what is sometimes referred to as “inclusivism,” in the sense employed by Cardinal Ratzinger: “The true meaning of what people call ‘inclusivism’ becomes apparent here: it is a matter, not of absorbing other religions externally, on the basis of a dogmatic postulate, as would do violence to them as phenomena, but of an inner correspondence that we may certainly call finality: Christ is moving through history in these forms and figures, as we may express it.” This is distinct from pluralism, which views all religions as equally veridical; the exclusivist may allow for veridicality in other religions, but only in some sort of correspondence with her religion. Such a view, as Ratzinger notes elsewhere, has the advantage of being concerned with religions on an individual basis, and thus avoids the tendency of pluralism to seek overly broad generalizations. This sort of “exclusivist inclusivism” allows for genuine interaction between religions and cultures without leading to the emasculation of religion that pluralism tends towards; the exclusivist, it is true, will be obliged to enter into conflict, not only with the beliefs of others, but even her own. If, however, our desire is to maximize truth, such conflict, when approached with an openness to truth whilst solidly grounded with a definite and internally consistent normative core, can give much greater basis for honestly examining religious traditions and their truth-validity.

But can one determine the absolute validity of one’s religion vis-à-vis other traditions? This is the basic question; it might existentially be phrased for our purpose, “Why remain a Christian- why not embrace Islam or Buddhism?” Adler suggests that investigation of religious truth can operate from the background of previously established truths in the realm of “transcultural” truths, such as in science and mathematics. This approach can certainly lend some aid to establishing the ongoing rationality of one’s exclusivist faith; so could any number of arguments, whether historical, experiential, or otherwise, that might be marshaled, in favour of Christianity versus other systems. However, at the end of all such arguments, it cannot be denied that faith is absolutely necessary, even if perhaps not via the existential starkness of Kierkegaard; there is no absolute middle ground on which equally intelligent and honest people can, without question begging, absolutely “prove” a given religion. This however- in correlation with broader epistemological concerns- need not serve as an absolute defeater for those who hold to an exclusivist position, particularly when the serious problems of religious pluralism are considered (to say nothing, due to the scope of this paper, of the religious agnostic’s problems). Instead, it should, as Baringer urges, lead to further careful consideration of beliefs and refined philosophical reflection. The question of religious diversity is by no means a settled or even particularly well-defined one in contemporary philosophy; considering its importance in the modern world however it is certainly one deserving of greater consideration and development.

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