Identity and Migration

The dilemma of immigration and identity ultimately converges with the larger problem of the valuelessness of postmodernity. The rise of relativism has made it harder for postmodern people to assert positive values and therefore the kinds of shared beliefs that they demand of migrants as a condition for citizenship. Postmodern elites, particularly those in Europe, feel that they have evolved beyond identities defined by religion and nation and have arrived at a superior place. But aside from their celebration of endless diversity and tolerance, postmodern people find it difficult to agree on the substance of the good life to which they aspire in common.

Immigration forces upon us in a particularly acute way discussion of the question “Who are we?”, posed by Samuel Huntington. If postmodern societies are to move towards a more serious discussion of identity, they will need to uncover those positive virtues that define what it means to be a member of the wider society. If they do not, they may be overwhelmed by people who are more sure about who they are.

Francis Fukuyama, Identity and Migration

The problem, of course, is that postmodern society is essentially devoid of concrete values; what values exist are remnants, memories and echoes from earlier epochs. That does not, however, necessarily rob a society of impetus; it is quite possible to forge actions and policies guided by nothing more than one’s immediate situation alongside the background remnants of values. It does seriously undermine such a society, even if not existentially. Can our society succesfully arrive at some common ground of value and meaning? I rather doubt it, at least for the foreseeable future.

Ornamentalism

Finished today a nice little tome, Ornamentalism, by David Cannadine, in which he argues, contra (well, under a mitigated contra really) Edward Said that British views of ‘the Orient’ were not all based upon race and the ever-abiding sense of ‘the Other.’ Instead, much British Imperial policy- particularly, if not primarily after the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857- was structured around ideas of class and hierarchy. Guided by a fusion, on the one hand, of pre-Enlightenment ideas of rank and hierarchy, which had little to do with race or ethnicity, and on the other an emergent British Imperial ideology, Imperial policy sought to recognize native aristocracy and hierarchies. These native hierarchies could be collaboraters with the British, who often saw themselves as protectors of native tradition, as Western capitalism engulfed the East. British Tories saw in native societies parallels with their own traditional, rural, aristocratic order; they also saw in such native societies a means of perpetuating the traditional ideas associated with such orders. Hence the British approached native culture and pre-existing hierarchies with a greater degree of respect and appreciation than Said would suggest. Most importantly, they saw in these societies a self-image, a reflection of their own traditions.

The problem- or rather, one of the problems- was that British constructions of native societies were often poorly drawn. They saw aristocracies and classes where there were none, or not as the British wished to percieve them. Not only that, but they tended to neglect the contingencies of native societies and their maleableness- prefering to see them as ancient and unyielding. The British found themselves unable to engage and confront the developing nationalist narratives and agitations in the rising educated middle classes- fueled by the sweeping technological change and urbanization of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries- of their holdings; nor did they consistently secure the adequate cooperations and collaberation of the native elite. All of these elements, Cannadine argues, contributed to the eventual failure of the British project in regards to native hierarchies- and the Empire in general.

Cannadine makes compelling arguments, considering the brevity of the book. His arguments for the importance of class and hierarchy in contrast to preoccupation with race are quite compelling, though, as he himself notes, the full reality of British Imperial imagination and activity is a mixture of both elements.

The salient point of Ornamentalism is, I think, its deconstruction of the radical separation and antagonism so often depicted as existing between ‘colonizer and colonized,’ ‘East and West,’ and so on. Instead, the historical reality in British Imperialism- especially in regards to India- is, as anywhere else in history, quite complex, with overlapping levels of Anglo-Indian relations and understandings. This is reflected in literature for example- the more I read of period writings from British India the more struck I am with the complex, multilayered relation of the British to the subcontinent and its subculture. Today I browsed through a volume of ‘Asian Miscellanies,’ which included, among other things, English translations of Mughal love poetry and two hymns to Hindu deities composed by an Englishman. Such example of ‘hybridity’ can be extended much further. William Dalrymple’s excellent book White Mughals presents a masterful examination of one such extension, in which a British official, James Kirkpatrick, married a high-class Indian, Khair un-Nissa (the idea and importance of class vis a vis race is prominent throughout, incidentally); in the process he converted to Islam.

In short, the interaction of ‘East and West’ is not and has never been simple or dualistic, much as some would like to think. This should be obvious enough, but we have a tendency, expressed in historical study and elsewhere, to desire easy systems and simplifications. History- and especially massive cultural interaction such as experienced in empire- cannot be easily systemized or simplified.

The Result is What Counts!

“…from all kinds of socialists, and most of all from the most modern, infallible, and intolerant Teaching, which consists of this one thing only: They result is what counts! It is important to forge a fighting Party! And to seize power! And to hold on to power! And to remove all enemies! And to conquer in pig iron and steel! And to launch rockets!

“And though for this industry and for these rockets it was necessary to sacrifice the way of life, and the integrity of the family, and the spiritual health of the people, and the very soul of our fields and forests and rivers—to hell with them! The result is what counts!

“But that is a lie!”

Alexander Solzhenitsyn

Via Light on Dark Water

India Rickshaw Challenge

Balakrishnan is the official mechanic of the Indian Autorickshaw Challenge, a contest intended to transform his country’s back-alley drag racing craze into an internationally recognized sport (or, more likely, spectacle). Auto-rickshaws – motorized, small-wheeled tricycles with room for a driver and two passengers – serve as taxis throughout India. With a high center of gravity and a tendency to roll, though, they aren’t known for safety, and police are cracking down on racers who risk their lives – and those of bystanders – by whizzing down gullies and drainage ditches in a quest for recognition and gold-necklace prizes.

The India 1000

While visiting southwest China in 2005 I saw auto rickshaws (san lan chi if I recall correctly is the Chinese term- ‘three wheel vehicle’) daily: everything from the speedy little ones that dodged around the buses and SUV’s and pony carts on the main  avenue from the countryside into town, to the ‘extended cab’ rickshaws that would be packed to capacity with farm workers riding in from town or the fields. All bumped and rocked on the unpaved (I think it might have been paved at one time in the distant past) road with a surface that looked like it had been cluster bombed repeatedly. When it rained some of the craters would become ponds and the rickshaws had to drive around the edges.

I only rode in a rickshaw a few times; a taxi or bus was faster. But a few times the only option was rickshaw; if off in the countryside it was impossible to get a bus or taxi, leaving only rickshaws and trucks. Riding in a rickshaw is rather like riding an unbroken horse. They- at least the ones I rode in- have no shocks, apparently, so every bump was felt- and there were lots of them. With several Americans in one rickshaw made for several Chinese: let’s just say there was a weight difference that neither rickshaw nor driver was used to!

Narratives and Otherwise

From the New York Times, The Global Clash of Emotions:

The war that is unfolding is one that the culture of humiliation cannot win, but it is a war nonetheless and one that the West can lose by continuing to be divided or by betraying its liberal values and its respect for law and the individual. The challenge is not figuring out how to play moderate Islam against the forces of radicalism. It is figuring out how to encourage a sufficient sense of hope and progress in Muslim societies so that despair and anger do not send the masses into the radicals’ arms.

One of the immense strengths of the radical message that swept Iran by way of the Ayatollah was its ability to combide Quranic principles of social justice and righteousness with a powerful narrative of revolution infused with socialist, Marxist even, overtones. Not only was the power of Islamic social action (with its strong emphasis upon egalitarianism- at least within the Islamic community) tapped, but so were more modern ideas of leftist revolution, and in the aftermath a centralized welfare state economy was erected, again channeling a fusion of Islam and revolutionary spirit. While this specific course of narrative and action has not been repeated in precisely the same manner, its basic parameters have been picked up throughout the Middle East. Groups like Hamas and Hezbollah draw much of their power from such a narrative of justice, social action, and militarized Islam.

This is hardly anything new, of course- Marxist groups of the twentieth century (and to a lesser extent, this century) constructed narratives of social justice, morality, and action linked with a specific militarized ideology. The Peruvian Maoists Shining Path, for example, sought (initially) to exploit inequitable and unjust situations of the Andean and Liman poor to create a base for its ‘people’s revolution.’ In the face of increasingly diminished support from the people, it resorted more and more to simple brute violence to support an ever more vicious narrative of revolution by blood-bath. 

Shining Path, and most other such groups, rejected religion out of hand. Many modern groups- ‘terrorist’ and otherwise- however have ideologies strongly shaped by religion, or at the very least, ethnic identities closely tied to religion. Like earlier groups, they exploit the situations present at the ‘fringes’ of the globalized world, drawing people- particularly in the Islamic world, where, as the above author notes, there is an ongoing reality of decay, with a culture that has to a certain sense internalized that feeling of decay- into their narrative of justice, righteousness, religion, and violent action.

What is to be done? The above article lends the beginnings of an answer: an alternative vision must be offered. Against the narratives offered by the fusion of religion and violent ideology there must be a more compelling, more powerful narrative. And that narrative cannot be one of free-market economies, or welfare-state socialism, or democracy and civic society- whatever the merits of those things may be. Rather, what narrative is more compelling than that of the Gospel, spoken in such a way as to meet the very real and very valid concerns of people at these fringes of the globalized world- fringes that in many ways form the centre? For hopelessnes and despair, decay and inequity and injustice, are hardly confined to the Islamic world. Rather, they are forces thick over the entire world, even if they seem hidden behind a facade of McDonalds, Starbucks, and international airports.

Christianity possesses the narrative of all narratives, the message that proclaims the truth about the world, and offers hope and life beyond anything presented by other narratives. Eschewing violence, it proclaims a God incarnate and crucified for the life of the world, speaking hope to the poor and downtrodden. It is not a narrative of raw power or economic force, but instead of humility and powerful love: ready to meet the humiliated, the inhabitants of a decaying world. For us to carry this narrative means living it into the world, as people who love actively and wisely, recognizing the other in the light of Christ, and approaching the evils and inequities of the world honestly.

Democracy will not save the world. Representative government will not solve the ills of the Middle East. Only the incarnately spoken truth of Christ crucified will set men truly free, whether in Tehran or New York.

Postmoderns and Selling More Stuff

From the Economist, via Arts & Letters: Postmodernism Is the New Black:

More surprising, perhaps, than the pomos’ influence on the way business presents itself was the accuracy of their predictions and the perspicacity of their perceptions. Modern retailers are only just getting to grips with two of the consequences of the breakdown of authority and hierarchy that they hoped for half a century ago: the “fragmentation” of narratives and the individual’s ability to be “the artist of his own life”.